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Beating Them at Their Own Game: A
Solution to the U.S. Foreign Sales
Corporation Crisis
John Seiner*
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, both corporations and individuals pay
federal taxes based on income.1 In contrast, the majority of U.S.
trading partner countries tax companies based on the value the
companies add to the goods they sell.2 The European Union's
(EU) Value Added Tax (VAT) gives member countries tax breaks
on exports, resulting in a cost advantage for European compa-
nies.3 The United States is skeptical of the regressive nature of
consumption taxes such as the VAT, but it wants to give export-
ing corporations tax advantages similar to those provided by the
VAT.4 To achieve those advantages, Congress created Foreign
Sales Corporations (FSCs). FSCs allow corporations to defer tax
on income that flows through subsidiaries located in foreign
countries. 5 The EU successfully challenged the validity of the
FSC tax scheme by lodging a complaint with the World Trade
Organization (WTO).6 The WTO found FSCs constituted an il-
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2000, Uni-
versity of Minnesota Carlson School of Management. Special thanks to June Pineda
for her encouragement and support, and to George Mundstock for his guidance. For
my father, Dennis Seiner.
1. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 2002) (stating that the federal tax is im-
posed on the income of the taxpayer as defined in I.R.C. § 61).
2. Laura Dale, The Economic Impact of Replacing the Federal Income Tax
with a Federal Consumption Tax: Leveling the International Playing Field, 9
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J., 47, 47 (2000).
3. Christopher Deal, The GATT and VAT: Whether VAT Exporters Enjoy a
Tax Advantage Under the GATT, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 649, 649
(1995); Dale, supra note 2, at 52.
4. See Deal, supra note 3, at 651.
5. See generally I.R.C. §§ 921-27 (1994).
6. WTO Panel Report on the United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign
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legal export subsidy in violation of the GATT.7
Part I of this Note examines the current differences be-
tween the United States' tax on income and the EU's VAT and
the recent WTO rulings invalidating FSCs. Part II discusses
tax competition among other countries and analyzes how the
competition affects tax revenue bases. Part III provides three
possible solutions to the FSC dispute: (A) leaving the FSC provi-
sions the way they are; (B) switching to a VAT for corporate
taxation; and (C) changing the corporate tax policy to a territo-
rial system by removing all taxes on foreign source income. Part
IV concludes the third option is best in light of current economic
conditions.
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION INVOLVING TAX POLICY
DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S VALUE ADDED TAx
1. An Introduction to the VAT
The EU's VAT is considered a consumption tax;8 it taxes
goods and services when consumed instead of taxing income.9 A
simple example of a consumption tax is a state or local sales tax.
Consumers pay a sales tax when they purchase goods. The VAT
uses a slightly more complicated method to tax businesses. To
understand how the VAT applies to businesses, consider the
process used in canning vegetables. First, the farmer buys seed
and fertilizer to grow the vegetables. Next, she harvests the
vegetables and sells them. The farmer must pay a tax on the
amount she receives from the transaction. Under the VAT, she
Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/R, [ 7.130 (Oct. 8, 1999), at http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter October Panel Report].
7. See id.
8. See Alan Schenk, The Plethora of Consumption Tax Proposals: Putting the
Value Added Tax, Flat Tax, Retail Sales Tax, and USA Tax Into Perspective, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1281, 1289-93 (1996); see also Alan Schenk, Choosing the Form of a
Federal Value-Added Tax: Implications for State and Local Retail Sales Taxes, 22
CAP. U. L. REV. 291, 297-98 (1993).
9. See Choosing the Form of a Federal Value-Added Tax, supra note 8, at 297-
98; see, e.g., Value Added Tax Act, 1994, c. 23, § 1(1) (Eng.).
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is entitled to deduct from her tax any taxes previously paid on
her inputs, 10 such as any tax paid on products or services used
by the farmer to grow the vegetables. For example, the farmer
would deduct any amount of tax paid for seed or fertilizer. Con-
tinuing the example, if the vegetables are sold to a cannery
where they are processed, canned, and sold to a store, the can-
nery must pay a tax based on the amount it received from the
store. Under a VAT scheme, the cannery deducts the amount of
any taxes already paid on the goods. The cannery's deductions
include the tax paid by the farmer and any other deductions the
farmer took. When the can of vegetables is sold at the store, the
consumer pays the final tax, which is adjusted for all taxes pre-
viously paid by the farmer, the cannery, and so on.
2. The VAT Does Not Impose a Tax on Exports
From an international trade perspective, the key benefit of
a VAT scheme is that exports are not taxed." If the cannery in
the previous example exported the cans of vegetables to a for-
eign country, the cannery would not pay a tax on the transac-
tion.12 The theory behind such a tax break is the "destination
principle." 13
Under the destination principle, a good or service is taxed
where it is consumed. 14 If a good is not consumed in a country,
it should not be taxed in that country. Instead, the tax should
be placed on the good when it reaches its final destination. In a
country with a VAT scheme, a tax is placed on all goods con-
sumed within the country, including domestically produced
goods as well as imports.15
The VAT system-under which goods leaving the country
are not taxed, but imports are--creates significant disadvan-
tages to countries with tax systems based on income. 16 Theo-
retically, when a good leaves a VAT country, it should be taxed
by the foreign nation where it is consumed. 17 This is indeed
what happens in international transactions within the EU. 18
10. See, e.g., Value Added Tax Act, c. 23, § 25(2).
11. Dale, supra note 2, at 50.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. E.g., Value Added Tax Act, 1994, c. 23, § 1(1) (Eng.).
16. Dale, supra note 2, at 50.
17. E.g., Value Added Tax Act, c. 23, § 10.
18. See id.
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However, when EU goods are exported to a country where there
is no VAT-such as the United States-the goods avoid a sig-
nificant tax burden.19 The European company pays no VAT on
the export because the VAT is only levied on goods sold within
the country.20 Usually, the goods face a consumption tax when
they are purchased. 21 But, when goods are sold to the United
States, they are not subject to a federal consumption tax.22
Conversely, when goods leave a country like the United
States and enter a VAT country, the destination state assesses
its domestic consumption tax on the goods.23 If a company in
the United States exports goods to Europe, the company faces a
tax imposed on the consumption of the goods when they are sold
in Europe24 in addition to the U.S. income tax based on the prof-
its from the foreign sales. 25 In effect, this double-taxation sys-
tem puts U.S. exporters at a disadvantage, and attempts to alle-
viate the resulting burden were sought.26
Countries in the European Economic Community (EEC)
agreed to use the VAT in the Treaty of Rome. 27 The purpose of
enacting a common form of consumption tax was to reduce the
negative effects on trade arising from disparate taxation sys-
tems.28 Before the countries settled on a VAT consumption tax,
they considered alternative tax schemes. 29 Committees investi-
gating tax options selected the VAT because it avoided many of
the problems associated with a strict consumption tax.30 The
strict consumption tax problem the EEC sought to avoid was the
cascade effect.3'
The cascade effect occurs when a tax is levied at each stage
19. Since the exported goods (i) do not face a VAT in their originating country,
see Value Added Tax Act, c. 23, § 1(1), and (ii) do not face a VAT in the United States
where they are sold, see supra note 1, the exported goods circumvent considerable
taxes.
20. See supra text accompanying note 15.
21. See supra text accompanying note 17.
22. See text accompanying note 1.
23. E.g., Value Added Tax Act, 1994, c. 23, § 1(1)(c) (Eng.).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., I.R.C. §1 (stating that the federal tax is imposed on the income of
the taxpayer as defined in I.R.C. §61).
26. See discussion infra Part I.B.
27. Craig A. Hart, The European Community's Value-Added Tax System:
Analysis of the Transitional Regime and Prospects for Further Harmonization, 12
INT'L TAx & Bus. LAW. 1, 4 (1994).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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of the production process and no tax deduction is allowed for
taxes already paid.32 In the can of vegetables example, a tax
percentage would be applied at each stage of production when
the vegetables change hands. No deduction would be allowed
for taxes paid earlier in the production chain. If one company
owned the seed producer, the farm, the cannery, and the dis-
tributor, the company could avoid most taxes. Such a company
would be classified as vertically integrated. The vertically inte-
grated company would only pay the tax levied on the sale of the
product to the retail store. The VAT aims to avoid windfalls to
vertically integrated companies by allowing deductions to each
business involved in the production of a good equal to the
amount of tax previously paid on the good.33
After the EEC decided on the VAT, its members chose to
make the EEC tax system destination-based 34 by basing tax
rates on the final sale price of goods to the ultimate consumer. 35
In order for the destination-based system to work, the countries
seeking free trade had to agree on a common rate structure.36
To adhere to the free trade concepts in the Treaty of Rome, each
country needed to treat companies abroad similar to companies
within their borders. 37 Thus, tax rates were harmonized during
the implementation of the EU's VAT.38
B. THE CREATION OF FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES
1. Problems with Implementing the VAT in the United States
Instead of a consumption tax, the United States uses an in-
come tax based on accessions to wealth. 39 The United States
continues to tax income because it perceives problems with the
VAT. The first problem with the VAT-as a consumption tax
system-is its regressive nature.40 The regressive features are
illustrated in the following example involving two roommates.
32. See id.
33. See Hart, supra note 27, at 4.
34. Id. at 8.
35. See id. at 3.
36. See id. at 36.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See I.R.C. §§1, 61 (West. Supp. 2002).
40. Hart, supra note 27, at 5.
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Taxpayer A earns $25,000 per year, and taxpayer B earns
$100,000 per year. Taxpayers A and B evenly split the $20,000
cost of rent and utilities by paying $10,000 each. Taxpayer A
spends another $10,000 on food and clothing. Since taxpayer B
has more income, taxpayer B spends $15,000 on food and cloth-
ing. Under a consumption tax system, taxpayer A is taxed on
the $20,000 spent during the year, and taxpayer B is taxed on
the $25,000 spent during the year. The result is that 80% of
taxpayer A's income is taxed, but only 25% of taxpayer B's in-
come is taxed. The regressive nature of the tax means people
with low incomes spend a much larger percentage of their in-
come on taxes than people with higher incomes.
A second problem with the VAT is that goods are taxed at
every sale regardless of whether the seller is making money.41
Consider a country with a 25% consumption tax and a retail
company that erroneously anticipated high consumer demand
and paid $4 per unit for goods. When the goods do not sell for
$5, the retailer is forced to reduce the price. If consumers will
only pay a total of $4 for each good, the company must sell at
that price. If there is a consumption tax of 25%, the company
will effectively sell the goods for $3 each as $1 per item is given
to the government. The company loses $1 on each good sold un-
der the consumption tax system. If a retailer is taxed on in-
come, it will not pay any tax, because at a price of $4, the com-
pany will not have any income from the sale. The company
loses money under the consumption tax system, but it breaks
even under the income tax system.
Although the United States maintains an income tax sys-
tem to avoid the problems discussed above, the friction created
between the VAT and income tax methods puts U.S. corpora-
tions at a disadvantage.4 2 U.S. corporations that export to EU
nations face the VAT import tax when the goods are consumed
in Europe and face an income tax related to those sales in the
United States.43 Conversely, companies in the EU do not pay
the VAT on exports, and no consumption tax is placed on the
goods in the United States.4
41. Some commentators argue that small businesses already bear a significant
cost burden due to the tax on income in the US. The burden stems from the high
costs associated with calculating taxable amounts and complying with other internal
revenue code policies. Dale, supra note 2, at 52-53.
42. Dale, supra note 2, at 52.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 17-25.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
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2. The DISC
In 1971, Congress attempted to put U.S. corporations on
equal footing with those in the EU by enacting a law creating
Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs). 45 The DISC
legislation allowed corporations to create domestic entities
through which their sales to foreign nations would flow.4 6 Cor-
porations set up these subsidiaries to meet the statutory re-
quirements and elected to make them DISCs on their income
tax returns.47  Finally, corporations used the DISC to export
goods to other countries.48  Profits from DISCs were not taxed
unless such profits were distributed to shareholders as divi-
dends.49  If corporations retained the profits and reinvested
them within the company, taxes were conceivably avoided en-
tirely.5 0
The European Community (EC) complained that DISC tax
avoidance violated the GATT and eventually brought an action
to prevent the United States from continuing the tax scheme.51
The GATT panel agreed with the European members and found
that DISCs were illegal subsidies under the treaty.5 2  Rather
than disputing the decision and risking further confrontation,
the United States announced it would change the DISC legisla-
tion to fit the requirements of the GATT.53
45. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 501, 85 Stat. 497 (1971); see also
Cecelia B. Skeen, Knick-Knack Paddy Whack Leave the FSC Alone: An Analysis of
the WTO Panel Ruling That the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation Program is an Ille-
gal Export Subsidy Under GATT, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 69, 72 (2000).
46. Id.
47. Hunter R. Clark et al., The WTO Ruling on Foreign Sales Corporations:
Costliest Battle Yet in an Escalating Trade War Between the United States and the
European Union?, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 291, 298 (2001). Corporations desir-
ing to create a DISC and enjoy the tax benefits had to make the subsidiary meet cer-
tain prerequisites. First, a minimum of 95% of the gross receipts of the subsidiary
had to come from exports. Id. Second, 95% of the subsidiary's assets had to fit a
qualified definition. Id. Third, the subsidiary had to contain a capital investment of
at least $2,500 and issue only one class of stock. Id. Finally, the company owning
the subsidiary had to make the proper election. Id.
48. By 1979, the estimated increase in exports due to DISCs was $2.5 billion.
Id.
49. Id. at 297.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 298.
52. Id.
53. Clark et al., supra note 47, at 298.
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3. The FSC
In 1984, the United States created the Foreign Sales Corpo-
ration (FSC).5 4 These entities were intended to solve the prob-
lems DISCs encountered yet still provide U.S. corporations with
a tax reduction on export income. 55 Among other requirements,
to qualify for tax breaks under FSC regulations, a company had
to set up a corporation in another country and conduct "eco-
nomic processes" there.5 6 Economic processes were defined as:
(1) promoting sales and advertising; (2) handling customer or-
ders and organizing delivery; (3) transporting goods from the
time the FSC received them until delivery; (4) accepting pay-
ment and producing final receipt; and (5) assuming credit risk.57
A company needed to show either that 50% of its costs of com-
pleting the above processes were incurred outside of the United
States, or that 85% of the total costs for only two of the above
processes were incurred outside the US. 58 Most corporations
could easily complete 85% of their order processing and payment
acceptance in a foreign country and thus could qualify their FSC
for tax benefits.59
Once the entity qualified for FSC status under the tax code,
it could conduct business free from U.S. taxes.60 The only taxes
an FSC would face were those imposed by the country where the
FSC was located.61 When the FSC had profits, it could pay the
profits to the parent company in the form of a tax-free divi-
dend.62  If the parent company then issued a dividend to its
shareholders, the dividends would be treated like any other
dividend and taxed as individual income to the shareholders. 63
To illustrate the benefits of FSCs, consider again the can-
54. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§801-5, 98 Stat. 494,
985-1003 (1984).
55. Skeen, supra note 45, at 73.
56. Stanley I. Langbein, INTERNATIONAL DECISION: United States-Tax
Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations", 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 553 (2000).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Clark et al., supra note 47, at 299.
61. Id. U.S. tax code does not control the manner in which the country that
hosts the FSC decides to tax the FSC. Generally, corporations choose foreign na-
tions with little or no taxes as places to incorporate their subsidiary FSC. See id.
62. Id.
63. See id. When a citizen receives a dividend payment from a corporation in
the form of a dividend, it is individual income taxed under federal law. I.R.C. § 61
(West Supp. 2002). However, the dividend is larger because the corporation did not
have to pay taxes on the dividend, as it was earned through a FSC.
[Vo1.11:395
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nery in the can of vegetables example. If the cannery exports its
goods to Europe, the European VAT will impose an import tax
when the vegetables are sold. The cannery must also pay the
U.S. income tax on profits earned from the sale. Because the
cannery faces both taxes, it is unlikely to produce a competi-
tively priced export.
If the cannery sets up a subsidiary that qualifies as an FSC,
it has a better chance of producing a competitively priced prod-
uct. If the cannery sets up part of its operations so it can receive
orders and payments and handle shipping or delivery in a for-
eign country, it can avoid the U.S. tax on income earned through
foreign sales. Since the only tax the goods face is the consump-
tion tax of countries where the goods are consumed, the cannery
will be on equal footing with its competitors in VAT countries.
C. THE CONFRONTATION MOVES INTO THE WTO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCESS
1. Dispute Resolution Process
The WTO dispute resolution process is designed to solve
disputes between countries and create a better environment for
free trade.64 The dispute resolution process begins with a WTO
consultation during which government representatives from
each country directly involved review the disputed issue.65 The
consultation usually lasts less than four hours,66 and if it does
not result in a resolution, the countries can move forward in the
WTO system.67
Next, the countries request the creation of a Panel to hear
the dispute and make a recommendation. 68 After the Panel has
issued its decision, the losing party must file notice of its intent
to appeal or persuade member countries of the Dispute Settle-
ment Body to vote against the Panel's decision.6 9 The winning
64. Mark Clough, The WTO Dispute Settlement System - A Practitioner Per-
spective, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 252, 252 (2000).
65. Settling Disputes, in Trading Into the Future: The Introduction to the
WTO, at httpJ/www.wto.orglenglishlthewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/tif-e.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2002).
66. Clough, supra note 64, at 254.
67. Id. at 259.
68. Settling Disputes, supra note 65.
69. Id.
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party has the option of rejecting the Panel's decision.70 If the
decision of the Panel is appealed, the Appellate Body hears the
dispute and can affirm or reverse the Panel's decision. 71 The
Appellate Body is unlikely to overturn the decision of the
Panel. 72
If either the Panel or the Appellate Body finds the disputed
law violates trade agreements and decides it should be removed,
the country has one month to inform the Dispute Settlement
Body of its intentions. 73 The violating country is then given a
reasonable time to resolve the issue.74 After the resolution, if
the winning country wants to challenge the actions of the violat-
ing country as inconsistent with the WTO decision, the original
panel is called upon to deliver a decision about the sufficiency of
the violating country's remedy.75 If the Panel finds the violating
country's attempt to remedy the problem was not sufficient, the
violating country may appeal once again to the Appellate
Body.76
2. The WTO Decisions Regarding FSCs
On November 18, 1997, the EU challenged the FSC provi-
sions of the U.S. tax code, asserting the provisions violated the
GATT. 77 The parties did not settle in the consultation stage, so
the Dispute Settlement Board established a Panel to hear the
issue.78 On October 8, 1999, the Panel distributed its report,
finding the FSC provisions violated multiple trade agreements.79
The United States promptly declared its intention to appeal.80
The Appellate Body issued its findings on February 24,
2000.81 Although it disagreed with some of the Panel's findings,
70. Clark et al., supra note 47, at 300.
71. Settling Disputes, supra note 65.
72. Kimberly J. Pinter, Diplomacy Along with Tax Law Change Needed to Re-
solve Dispute with European Union Over U.S. Export Tax Breaks, 20 TAX MGMT.
WKLY. REP. 1235 (2001) (discussing how the WTO's Appellate Body is unlikely to
reverse the decision of the Panel in the Foreign Sales Corporation dispute).
73. Clough, supra note 64, at 260.
74. Id.
75. Settling Disputes, supra note 65.
76. Id.
77. Clough, supra note 64, at 266.
78. Id.
79. See id. (discussing the panel's finding that the FSCs violated Article 3.1(a)
of the SCM Agreement and Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture).
80. Id. at 266.
81. Id.
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the Appellate Body found the U.S. laws providing tax breaks to
FSCs violated trade agreements.8 2 The United States then in-
formed the WTO of its plans to remedy the situation and bring
the tax scheme into compliance with trade agreements.8 3
In November of 2000, Congress followed through with its
plans by passing the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act of 2000.84 The EU viewed the repeal as an insuf-
ficient change to the original FSC provision,8 5 so it brought a
complaint to the WTO Panel and won again.8 6 This time, the
EU won the opportunity to retaliate with approximately $4 bil-
lion in sanctions.87 The United States appealed, but the Appel-
late Body agreed that the new legislation still violated trade
agreements.88
After the Appellate Body ruled, the EU revealed a list of
items that might be subject to the sanctions.8 9 The list included:
"steel, meat products, cereals, textiles, and aircraft."90 The
threat of sanctions is not immediate due to the turbulent world
economy and an associated reluctance to enter a trade war.91
In sum, the current WTO Appellate Body ruling provides
that FSCs are in violation of the GATT.92 However, without a
mechanism such as FSCs, U.S. corporations are at a compara-
tive disadvantage relative to their foreign competitors.
82. Id. The U.S. tax provisions violated trade agreements because they were
too similar to export subsidies. Id. The tax code normally requires a tax payment
levied on all income earned by U.S. corporations. However, the tax code sections at
issue provide a special tax absolution to income earned outside the United States
through FSCs. Id. Thus, the WTO believes the U.S. government is unfairly subsi-
dizing exports by providing exporting corporations a significant tax break. Id.
83. Clough, supra note 64, at 267.
84. FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000).
85. Clark et al., supra note 47, at 293-94.
86. See WTO Panel Report on United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 2001), at http://www.wto.org [herein-
after August Panel Report].
87. Id.
88. See id. at 60-61.
89. Barry James, U.S. and EU Seek to Cool Trade Fires After Ruling But Inter-
nal Pressures on Both Sides Resist Compromise on WTO, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (New
York), Jan. 16, 2002 at 4.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. August Panel Report, supra note 86, at 60.
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II. TAX COMPETITION
Tax competition among countries stems from the increasing
liquidity of business capital and the global differentiation in tax
rates. 93 Companies have the ability to select their place of in-
corporation.94 When a company can receive capital investments
from foreign markets in the chosen country, it will select the
country that imposes the smallest burdens.95
Individual investors can also choose the corporations in
which to invest their money based on the amount of taxes the
corporations incur.96  Many countries, unlike the United
States,97 do not tax citizens' income earned in a foreign country.
Because of that, taxpayers base investment decisions on the tax
liability they will face in a foreign country. For example, con-
sider a taxpayer living in country 1, which does not tax income
earned in foreign countries. The taxpayer can choose between
two investments: company A in country 2 or company B in coun-
try 3. Companies A and B each produce profits of $100 million
per year. However, company A faces the tax system of country 2
that imposes a 40% tax on corporate income, and company B
faces the tax system of country 3 that imposes a 25% tax on cor-
porate income. Thus, after taxes, company A will have $60 mil-
lion to distribute to shareholders, and company B will have $75
million. Rational investors will choose company B because of its
smaller tax burden. This example shows how a country's corpo-
rate tax scheme can affect capital investment in that country's
corporations.
Although taxation is one factor in deciding where to incor-
porate, companies make significant tradeoffs in picking the
93. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000); see also Harry
Grubert and John Mutti, Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer Pricing in Multinational Cor-
porate Decision Making, 73 REV. OF ECON. AND STAT. 285 (1991) (concluding that
tariffs and taxes have significant effects on decisions of multinational corporations).
94. Robert Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multi-
national Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 18 (1993).
95. Id.
96. Increasing amounts of information available to investors regarding foreign
investment opportunities have led to dramatic changes in the investment behavior
of average investors. No current portfolio is complete unless it has at least one in-
ternational security or fund. See Christopher Farrell, Global Investing: Global
Strategies, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 11, 2000, at 160.
97. The United States taxes all income from whatever source derived. I.R.C. §§
1, 61 (West Supp. 2002). Even United States citizens living abroad are assessed an
income tax. They do, however, receive tax credits for any income taxes they pay in
the foreign nation. I.R.C. § 861 (West Supp. 2002).
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country with the smallest income tax.98 Companies considering
low tax nations need to take into account the education level of
potential workers to determine whether additional training will
be needed, public transportation infrastructure to ensure input
materials can be shipped to production facilities and goods can
be shipped out to customers, and the availability and cost of re-
sources needed to produce goods.99 Companies must also con-
sider potential government interference and corruption.
Finally, capital is not completely liquid, yet. As stated
above, companies have the luxury of deciding where to incorpo-
rate due to greater capital availability. 100 Companies in some
countries have access to capital markets sufficient to obtain fi-
nancing for their businesses, but others do not.10 The countries
with insufficient capital markets do not have adequate banking
and securities regulations to entice foreign investment. 10 2 Still,
the United States needs to remain mindful of the tax competi-
tion it faces abroad. The U.S. tax base could shrink if corpora-
tions flee to other nations that offer smaller tax burdens and
sufficient resources. 0 3 The resulting decreased tax base would
force Congress to increase rates to sustain tax revenue or cut
spending for federal programs.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE FSC DISPUTE
Due to international tax competition, it appears that tax
breaks for U.S. exports are necessary. However, recent cases
brought against the United States by the EU resulting in hold-
ings that tax breaks funneled through FSCs are in violation of
the GATT. 04 Thus, the United States must decide whether to
disregard the WTO's decisions, remove tax breaks on exports, or
98. Avi-Yonah, supra note 93, at 1627.
99. See id. at 1627.
100. See supra note 96.
101. Some corporations simply follow the U.S. securities laws and obtain capital
through U.S. stock exchanges. Nokia, a company based in Finland, is listed on the
NYSE under NOK. Other countries have their own securities markets. See The
World Federation of Exchanges, at http://www.worldexchanges.org (last visited Apr.
3, 2002).
102. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 801-13 (2001) (explaining how laws and
institutions are essential for the development of a securities market in any country
before minority shareholders can be protected).
103. See Mitchell B. Weiss, International Tax Competition: An Efficient or Ineffi-
cient Phenomenon?, 16 AKRON TAxJ. 99, 112 (2001).
104. See supra Parts I, II.
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change the form of the tax breaks. 105
A. IGNORE THE WTO RULING
The United States could choose to ignore the WNTO. 106 In-
stead of acquiescing with and obeying the WTO's ruling, the
United States could continue to use FSCs in their current
form.10 7 Although $4 billion in sanctions are looming, there will
most likely be a significant delay before the EU actually imposes
them.108 Notably, FSCs allow corporations in the United States
to save about $4 billion per year in taxes. 0 9
Disobeying the WTO may buy the United States some time,
but it is not the best long-term solution. 10 Due to the new war
on terrorism,"' the EU will likely grant the United States more
time to deal with the FSC problem. 112 The EU is unlikely to en-
tirely forget about the issue. Any sympathy will be temporary,
and the $4 billion in sanctions could further depress a slowly re-
covering U.S. economy.
The events of September 11 have also created a situation in
which the United States needs allies.1'3 To wipe out terrorist
groups throughout the world, the United States needs coopera-
tion from many countries. If the United States ignores the WTO
ruling, countries aiding the war against terrorism may second-
guess their support of the United States.
105. See Ernest R. Larkins, WTO Appellate Body Rules Against FSCs: The
Search for Alternatives begins, 11 J. INT'L TAX'N 14, 16-18 (2001) (briefly identifying
the alternatives available to the United States). Another option is negotiating a set-
tlement with the EU. Id. However, that option does not appear likely because the
United States does not have a $4 billion bargaining chip, and if it did, it would have
negotiated instead of proceeding with Congress' unsuccessful modification of the
FSC provisions. Id.
106. Clark et al., supra note 47, at 298; Larkins, supra note 105, at 16.
107. See Larkins, supra note 105, at 16.
108. Ryan J. Donmoyer, U.S. May Tax International Corporations Differently:
WTO Wants Changes, Saying U.S. Provides Unfair Tax Breaks, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, at 33 (explaining that the EU is unlikely to impose the trade
sanctions any time soon because it will hurt large European companies that have
significant operations in the United States, such as Daimler-Chrysler.).
109. See Pinter, supra note 72, at 1235 (stating that the United States would
effectively raise corporate income tax revenues by $4 billion if the FSC provisions
were removed from the tax code).
110. See Larkins, supra note 105, at 16.
111. Michael Elliott, Hate Club: An In-depth Look at al-Qaeda, TIME, Nov. 12,
2001, at 58; Michael Hirsh & John Barry, How to Strike Back, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24,
2001, at 36.
112. See James, supra note 89.
113. Hirsh & Barry, supra note 111, at 36-37; see Elliott, supra note 111, at 58.
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Finally, ignoring the WTO ruling could weaken possibilities
of future beneficial trade agreements and weaken the reputa-
tion and power of the WTO. 114 The United States wants to be
involved in agreements with other countries that will expand
free trade. If the United States begins to disregard rulings of
the WTO, other countries will doubt U.S. commitment to trade
agreements in general. China's recent membership in the
WT0 115 helps to make the organization the best possibility for
true free trade on a global basis. China also offers the best
growth market for U.S. exports, so relations with China in par-
ticular should be handled with care.116
Ignoring the WTO ruling is not a feasible method of dealing
with the FSC problem. The United States cannot afford to lose
allies during its war against terrorism, and it should not disrupt
the global trend towards free trade. Congress needs to change
the tax code to a system that puts U.S. corporations on a level
playing field with the rest of the world.117 Two options are dis-
cussed below.
B. SWITCH TO A VALUE ADDED TAX
To prevent further violations of the GATT, the United
States could move to some form of value added taxation. Cur-
rent international tax competition has made the United States'
income tax system unfavorable to exporting businesses in com-
parison to businesses in VAT countries. 118
Some commentators have argued that income taxes in gen-
eral are behind the times.'1 9 As discussed above, the U.S. in-
come tax system creates disadvantages for corporations head-
quartered in America. Corporations can relocate their
headquarters, obtain capital from foreign markets and continue
operations while saving taxes.1 20 These factors compound prob-
114. See Larkins, supra note 105, at 16.
115. WTO, Trading intp the Future: An Introduction to the WTO, at
http://www.wto.org/englisldthewtoe/whatis e/tifie/org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 3,
2002) (listing China as a new member of the World Trade Organization on December
11, 2001).
116. See Bill Nichols & James Cox, Backers Hope China Pact Will Promote Re-
form, USA TODAY, Sept. 20, 2000, at 10A.
117. See supra Part II.
118. Weiss, supra note 103, at 104-107, 106 n.20 (explaining how tax competi-
tion is here to stay and how this competition led Congress to enact FSC legislation to
contend with other nations).
119. Id. at 130.
120. See Ferdinand P. Schoettle, Big Bucks, Cloudy Thinking: Constitutional
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lems of the current income tax.
Experts argue a consumption tax would help solve other
problems presented by the current income tax.121 The current
internal revenue code's provisions for business taxation are a
confusing mess of exceptions and definitions. 122 Experts argue
taxing consumption permits easier collection because taxing
consumption of goods or services by actual people is easier than
taxing a legal entity with no real physical existence. 123 Further,
they argue that moving to a consumption tax is better than try-
ing to patch together another export quasi-subsidy that will only
add to tax code complexity. 24 Taxing consumption would also
allow the United States to place a tax on imports.125 Taxing im-
ports is probably the most desirable benefit of a consumption
tax. The goods that leave EU countries (and face no export tax)
would be subject to the same consumption tax that goods pro-
duced in the United States face when sent to EU countries.
The United States could impose a VAT on businesses and
keep the income tax on individuals. Corporations would pay a
tax based on the amount of value they add to their products.
Thus, a company would pay a federal sales tax based on the
price at which goods are sold.' 26 The company would deduct
taxes previously paid in the line of production, thereby reducing
the tax paid by the company.' 21 Citizens would still pay a pro-
gressive income tax as well as the new federal sales tax. Keep-
ing the progressive individual income tax would reduce the re-
gressive effects of a consumption tax on purchases. 28 Congress
could also create exemptions for inelastic goods and place higher
rates on luxury goods in order to further reduce regressive ef-
fects. This type of tax scheme would anger taxpayers who would
be paying a consumption tax on purchases in addition to their
Challenges to State Taxes-Illumination from the GATT, 19 VA. TAX REV. 277, 338-
39 (1999).
121. See generally Gary C. Hufbauer, Income vs. Consumption Taxation: Domes-
tic and International Reforms, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1555 (2001) (explaining why
consumption taxation should win the longstanding debate between advocates for
income taxation and consumption taxation).
122. See I.R.C. §§ 341(e)(1), 382, 501(a) (2000).
123. See Hufbauer, supra note 121, at 1557.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1561.
126. See, e.g., Value Added Tax Act, 1994, c. 23, § 2 (Eng.) (assessing a 17.5% tax
on all goods and services sold within the United Kingdom).
127. See, e.g., Value Added Tax Act, c. 23, § 25.
128. See discussion supra Part I.B (discussing regressive taxes).
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personal income taxes.129
Congress is unlikely to remove the corporate income tax
and impose a VAT. If the United States changed to a VAT, con-
sumers would pay a national consumption tax, otherwise titled
a federal sales tax, on goods they purchase. Consumers would
likely be upset that their elected officials changed the revenue
code to benefit corporations. 130 Theoretically corporations would
reduce the price of their goods to reflect income tax removal, but
prices would almost certainly remain the same immediately af-
ter the change and slowly move downward toward market
equilibrium. 131
State and local governments would probably balk at the no-
tion of a federal sales tax. Traditionally in the United States,
state and local governments generate revenue through sales
taxes. 132 Local governments rely on sales tax revenues for large
portions, or sometimes all, of their budgets.133 If the federal
government adds its own sales tax, local governments will be
under more pressure to keep taxes low. To maintain their
budgets, local governments may have to increase existing sales
taxes or rely more heavily on other taxes for revenue such as
property or state individual income taxes. Although the Consti-
tution does not prevent the federal government from levying a
national sales tax,134 state and local governments would likely
argue that principles of federalism should prevent Congress
from invading a resource that has been traditionally left to local
governments.135
129. Theoretically, taxpayers' anger would be dissipated by lower prices. Since
under a VAT corporations would pay little or no income tax, corporations would
lower their prices. Ideally, consumers would pay about the same amount for goods
with the VAT consumption tax as they would pay under a corporate income tax sys-
tem.
130. See Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 191, 191
(2001) (discussing Americans' traditional distain for taxes).
131. Ideally, corporations would lower their prices because they do not have to
pay income taxes. See supra note 129. However, companies will probably squeeze
as much profit as they can out of the market. Once the first movers lower their
prices, others will have to follow suit, but the amount of time it might take is inde-
terminable. During the period of normal prices with the additional new tax, public
approval of the new system would likely be extremely low.
132. FERDINAND SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION AND FINANCE (Lexis
Publishing 2001) (discussing how historically, the federal government has left
transactional taxes, such as a standard sales tax, largely to the states).
133. See, e.g., State and Local Tax Receipts of Florida, available at
http://www.eog.state.fl.us/ dor/tables/f2fy0001r.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
135. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 610-11, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1655 (1995).
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Price distortion and related market inefficiencies from the
consumption tax136 would occur as well if a federal sales tax was
enacted. Corporations would have to pay a consumption tax on
sales even if they are not making a profit.137 Corporations
would have to add the tax amount into the selling price of their
goods, thus distorting price equilibrium. 38 Consumers would
pay what the good is worth on the market; producers would re-
ceive the market price minus the consumption tax.139 Despite
some desirable results, the undesirable consequences of a value
added tax make it an unlikely option.
C. USE A TERRITORIAL SYSTEM TO CHANGE THE CORPORATE TAX
CODE FROM TAXING ALL FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME TO TAXING
ONLY DOMESTIC INCOME
If the United States does not find a legitimate way to allow
tax breaks on exports, large multinational corporations will
have a significant incentive to incorporate elsewhere. 40 For
example, when U.S.-based Chrysler Corporation merged with
the German-based Daimler Benz, the new entity, Daimler
Chrysler, incorporated in Germany.' 4 '
The United States does not need to have the lowest taxes to
attract and retain corporations, but it does have to remain com-
petitive. 42 Tax competition among nations is healthy because it
helps keep government spending in check. 43 Corporations will
not simply run to incorporate in the country that provides the
best tax situation. They will search for the best overall mix of
136. See discussion supra Part I.B.
137. See discussion supra Part I.B.
138. See discussion supra Part I.B.
139. See discussion supra Part I.B.
140. See Grubert & Mutti, supra note 93, at 285-93; see also Weiss, supra note
103, at 112; see also Larkins, supra note 105, at 16. 'The Treasury Department es-
timated that the FSC program increased U.S. exports in 1992 by $150 billion."
Larkins, supra note 105, at 16. (citing U.S. Treasury Department, The Operation
and Effect of the Foreign Sales Corporation Legislation (Nov. 1997)). If all export
encouragement were removed, export growth would suffer greatly. Id.
141. See Donmoyer, supra note 108, at 33. However, Chrysler's operations lo-
cated in the United States still pay American income taxes. Arguably this tax bur-
den discourages the company from having offices and production factories in the
United States because these business units can be placed in areas with cheaper la-
bor and lower taxes.
142. Avi-Yonah, supra note 93, at 1632-39 (discussing how developed countries,
including the United States, need to remain tax competitive and still maintain reve-
nue to cope with the welfare needs of an aging population).
143. Weiss, supra note 103, at 128.
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tax burden, government services, government stability, access to
capital, access to talented employees, natural resources, and so
on.
As the recent WTO decisions regarding FSCs prove, the
United States cannot have a system that taxes all income
earned from foreign sources and then gives tax breaks to corpo-
rations when they earn income outside the United States.14 4
This form of tax relief is an illegal export subsidy,1 45 or it is too
similar to an illegal export subsidy for the WTO to allow.146
The United States can switch its corporate tax scheme to a
tax that is only levied on income earned in America. Foreign
source corporate income would be tax-free. Since the tax would
levy on income based on the territory in which it is earned and
no longer be premised on taxing all income wherever earned,
this scheme would not be an illegal export subsidy.147
The United States can emulate the tax system of France.
The French corporate tax does not impose a tax on profits
earned in a foreign country. 4 France's system is based on ter-
ritoriality, as explained by the following:
The French system of taxation of companies or enterprises is governed
by the principle of territoriality under which only income realized by
enterprises carried out in France is taxable. Conversely, profits real-
ized by enterprises carried out outside France are not taxable in
France, whatever the nationality or the place of location of the head of-
fice. 149
The key to the French system is that it is based on the principle
that only income earned in France is subject to tax.'50 Thus, it
144. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 86.
145. The GATT makes export subsidies illegal. General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190, 33 I.L.M 1153 (1994).
146. Langbein, supra note 56, at 546.
147. See WTO Appellate Report, United States-Tax Treatment for Foreign
Sales Corporations, WT/DS108/AB/R 179, (Feb. 24, 2000), at http://www.wto.org,
discussed in Larkins, supra note 105, at 19 (explaining that using a territorial sys-
tem is an "acceptable means of exempting export profits from taxation," under WTO
law, though foreign-source activities other than exporting would then also be ex-
empt).
148. Charles G.G. Campbell et al., Business Operations in France, 961-2nd TAX
MGMT. FOREIGN INCOME PORTFOLIOS (BNA) A-36 (1999). Unlike the United States,
France uses a less encompassing definition of corporate income. The French tax sys-
tem only taxes corporate income earned in France. Id.
149. Bruno Gouthi6re, Transfer Pricing Rules and Practice in France, 895 TAX
MGMT. FOREIGN INCOME PORTFOLIOS (BNA) A-3 (1997).
150. See Raj Bhala & David Gantz, 1 WTO Case Review, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 53 (2000) (explaining how the French tax system differs from the U.S.
system in that only income earned from sales in France is taxable).
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does not violate the GATT because it does not operate as an ille-
gal export subsidy.151
In contrast, the current FSC provisions of the United
States' tax code are viewed as an illegal export subsidy because
they are based on the principle of taxing income from whatever
source derived but then providing a tax break to exporters. 152 If
the United States would change its form of corporate income tax
to a system under which only income from sales in the United
States is taxed, corporations in the United States would be on
an equal playing field. Under such a system, corporations that
operate in the United States would not be taxed on profits
earned abroad.
Individual income tax rules would be unaffected by the for-
eign source income rules for corporations. 153 Individuals who
earn profits from investment overseas could still be taxed on
their gains. Ideally, multinational corporations would remain or
originate in the United States because of the new beneficial tax
system and the developed economy. Setting up the system so it
is beneficial for corporations to stay in or come to the United
States will provide benefits that outweigh the foregone revenue
an income tax on foreign profits would have earned.
A territorial tax scheme is not problem-free. There are two
problems with such a system. 54 First, the United States would
lose significant tax revenue. Although FSC regulations allow
corporations to earn some foreign income tax-free, tax revenue
is still raised by taxing foreign profits. 55 Not all exporting cor-
porations have set up FSCs to defer their income, and some cor-
porations cannot meet the requirements to become an FSC. 56
The revenue the government earns from these sources would
disappear if Congress decided to absolve foreign income from
taxation. To prevent this problem, Congress could enact a lower
tax rate on corporate foreign source income instead of exempting
151. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 86, and 143.
152. October Panel Report, supra note 86, 8.64; see also id. 1 8.119-22, 8.159,
9.1(a), 9.1(d) (finding FSCs inconsistent with the SCM Agreement and the GATT
1994).
153. The proposed change would only affect the corporate tax structure of the
revenue code. Individuals would still pay a tax on income from whatever source de-
rived.
154. A third problem not discussed in this article is the question of how the new
tax system would comply with the income tax treaties the United States has with
other countries. Larkins, supra note 105, at 19.
155. I.R.C. § 61 (West Supp. 2002).
156. See Langbein, supra note 56, at 553 (discussing requirements for FSC ex-
emption).
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it entirely from taxation. The tax rates could be set up in paral-
lel so that profits earned domestically in the United States
would be subject to the old corporate income tax, and profits
earned abroad would be taxed under the new foreign source in-
come tax system. In order to provide export support, the foreign
source income tax rates would be less than the domestic rates.
The new rates would have to be low enough to allow U.S. corpo-
rations to compete with EU companies, but the rates would have
to be high enough to provide sufficient funds to the U.S. gov-
ernment. Using a lower tax rather than totally wiping out a
corporate tax on foreign income is more likely to gain public
support.
The second problem with a territorial system is that setting
up the new regulations calls for separate and complicated rules
regarding the definition of foreign source income. 15 7 Currently,
corporations are treated the same as individuals under the tax
code.158 Creating a separate definition of taxable income for
corporations would require bifurcation of the tax code. How-
ever, corporate taxpayers, not individuals, would have to deal
with the complexity. Most multinational companies have tax
accountants and attorneys on staff to deal with complicated tax
issues. Additionally, the companies will have an incentive to
figure out the complexities because doing so will save them
money.
In sum, a territorial system that exempts foreign source in-
come or taxes it at a reduced rate appears to be the best solution
to the current tax problem in the United States.
CONCLUSION
When the WTO ruled against FSC's, a looming problem
with the U.S. tax policy was exposed: the current tax regula-
tions provide an illegal export subsidy.159 The roots of the prob-
lem are the inconsistency between tax systems in the EU and
157. Under a territorial tax system profits earned outside the country would not
be subject to taxation. Thus, the Internal Revenue Service would have to precisely
define which income is deemed earned outside the United States and thus subject to
the exemption or reduced rate. The I.R.C. already contains rules defining foreign
source income for the Foreign Tax Credit. See I.R.C. §§ 861 and 904 (West Supp.
2002).
158. See, e.g., AJF Transp. Consultants, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH)
1244 (applying I.R.C. § 61 to corporation). See generally I.R.C. § 61 (West Supp.
2002).
159. See October Panel Report, supra note 6.
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the United States, and increasing tax competition from small
and developing nations. Because of the tax discrepancies, ex-
porting corporations in the United States are at a disadvantage
compared to their EU counterparts. Without FSCs, corporations
in the United States pay taxes on profits from exported goods
that are also taxed in the destination country. Accordingly, the
United States needs to change its treatment of foreign source
income so that American corporations are not at a disadvantage
and the new policy does not violate trade agreements.
Ignoring the WTO or changing to a value added tax both
fail to solve the impending problems. Ignoring the WTO fails
because it is a bad political move and may hurt future multina-
tional agreements. Changing to a VAT consumption tax is
unlikely because it would not gain political support, it would
have price distorting effects, and it would not fit a service driven
economy. Instead, the United States should exempt from taxa-
tion or apply reduced rates to all corporate foreign source earn-
ings. With a territorial approach, the United States can give
corporations the benefit of tax-free exports without violating
trade agreements.
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